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A B S T R A C T   
How can we maximize what is learned from a replication study? In the creative destruction approach to repli-
cation, the original hypothesis is compared not only to the null hypothesis, but also to predictions derived from 
multiple alternative theoretical accounts of the phenomenon. To this end, new populations and measures are 
included in the design in addition to the original ones, to help determine which theory best accounts for the 
results across multiple key outcomes and contexts. The present pre-registered empirical project compared the 
Implicit Puritanism account of intuitive work and sex morality to theories positing regional, religious, and social 
class differences; explicit rather than implicit cultural differences in values; self-expression vs. survival values as 
a key cultural fault line; the general moralization of work; and false positive effects. Contradicting Implicit 
Puritanism’s core theoretical claim of a distinct American work morality, a number of targeted findings repli-
cated across multiple comparison cultures, whereas several failed to replicate in all samples and were identified 
as likely false positives. No support emerged for theories predicting regional variability and specific individual- 
differences moderators (religious affiliation, religiosity, and education level). Overall, the results provide evi-
dence that work is intuitively moralized across cultures.   
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The present initiative aimed to assess the robustness, generality, and 
cultural boundedness of prior findings on Implicit Puritanism, an ac-
count of the role of the United States’ cultural and religious history on 
the moral intuitions of contemporary Americans (Poehlman, 2007; 
Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Bargh, 2008, 2009; Uhlmann, Poehlman, Tan-
nenbaum, & Bargh, 2011). The theory of Implicit Puritanism draws on 
research on automatic and unconscious social cognition (Banaji, 2001; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Haidt, 2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and 
cross-disciplinary scholarship on America’s religious roots (Baker, 2005; 
de Tocqueville, 1840/1990; Landes, 1998; Lipset, 1996) to form testable 
empirical predictions about national differences in intuitive work and 
sex morality. According to the theory, a history of Puritan-Protestant 
influence has led traditional work and sex values to implicitly 
permeate U.S. culture, shaping the moral intuitions and unconscious 
reactions of even non-Protestant and less religious Americans. In 
contrast to cultural frameworks focused on East-West differences (e.g., 
Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Oyserman, Coon, & Kem-
melmeier, 2002) or comparisons between Western, Educated, Industri-
alized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) and non-WEIRD populations 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010), Implicit Puritanism focuses on 
cultural variability within Western societies. The implicit values of 
Americans— as elicited via moral scenarios, mindset manipulations, and 
priming paradigms— are contrasted with those of individuals from 
ostensibly similar Western societies with different religious histories (e. 
g., Canada, Australia, or the United Kingdom). 
Employing what we term a “creative destruction” approach to 
replication, we leveraged the complex set of experimental results and 
cultural differences hypothesized by Implicit Puritanism to further pre- 
specify alternative results predicted by competing accounts of work and 
sex morality. A number of these alternative frameworks posit that reli-
gious, regional, and social class differences are more important than 
national differences. Another perspective argues that cultural differ-
ences in the relevant values are explicit and conscious rather than im-
plicit and nonconscious. Yet another competing theory proposes that 
implicit orientations towards work and sexuality are consistent across 
cultures, perhaps due to common evolutionary roots. In addition to 
directly replicating the original study designs (Simons, 2014), this 
initiative strategically included new measures and samples— permitting 
not only a comparison of the original theoretical predictions (Poehlman, 
2007; Uhlmann et al., 2008, 2009, 2011) with the null hypothesis of no 
condition or group differences, but also tests of further ideas. We were 
then able to examine which theory best accounts for the results across 
multiple key outcomes and contexts. The goal, in the specific case of 
work morality across cultures but also more generally, was to identify 
ways to maximize the generativity and information gain from a repli-
cation initiative. 
1. Creative destruction in science 
The scientific community’s shaken faith in original effects that do not 
emerge in a single direct replication (same method, new observations; 
Simons, 2014) has been documented in the context of a prediction 
market (Dreber et al., 2015). More generally, debate and discussion 
regarding replications centers largely on the existence or nonexistence 
of a given finding, as opposed to testing competing predictions of pos-
itive effects against one another. Consider, however, that a replication 
could broaden its scope beyond the original design and theorizing, 
including further measures and conditions testing additional ideas 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2018). Large scale replications can and should be 
leveraged to simultaneously test multiple competing and complemen-
tary ideas that operate in the same theoretical space (Tierney et al., in 
press). 
The inspiration is Schumpeter’s (1942/1994) concept of the “gale of 
creative destruction” in a capitalistic economy, the “process of industrial 
mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new 
one.” Schumpeter characterizes capitalism as a cyclical process through 
which outmoded products, approaches, and organizations are destroyed 
and supplanted by stronger ones. The destruction is both healthy and 
necessary for improved institutions to emerge. The notion of creative 
destruction or a “Schumpeter’s gale” has a clear parallel in natural se-
lection in evolutionary biology. In the Origin of Species, Darwin (1872) 
noted that “extinction of old forms is the almost inevitable consequence 
of the production of new forms.” 
For too long, psychological theories have been sheltered and pro-
tected from disconfirmation, rather than subjected to the type of sur-
vival pressures Darwin outlined. Historically, approximately 1% of 
articles published in the fields of psychology and marketing are direct 
replications of prior work (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Hubbard & Arm-
strong, 1994; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012). Most of the research 
questions examined in the many thousands of papers published yearly 
are only ever pursued by the original laboratory, who are biased to 
confirm their own theories (Berman & Reich, 2010; Greenwald, Prat-
kanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986; Kuhn, 1962; Manzoli et al., 2014; 
Mynatta, Dohertya, & Tweneya, 1977). The recent movement to reex-
amine published findings suggests replication rates of 36% in psychol-
ogy (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), 11–25% in biomedicine 
(Begley & Ellis, 2012; Prinz, Schlange, & Asadullah, 2011), 61% in 
experimental economics (Camerer et al., 2016), 70% in experimental 
philosophy (Cova et al., 2018), and 62% for behavioral experiments 
published in elite journals (i.e., Science and Nature; Camerer et al., 
2018). Yet it is also worth considering what is left in the wake of a gale of 
failed replications. The original theory has been cast into doubt, but has 
a new, stronger theory emerged in its place? 
In the creative destruction approach to replication, the original hy-
pothesis is compared not only to the null hypothesis, but also to pre- 
registered (Van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012) predictions derived from 
multiple additional theories (Tierney et al., in press). This may involve 
administering new measures, adding further conditions, and testing new 
populations in addition to the original ones (what Brainerd & Reyna, 
2018, refer to as a Registered Report plus or RR+ approach). Which 
theoretical framework best accounts for the variance in outcomes is then 
rigorously assessed. This may lead to the conclusion that multiple 
complementary theories are needed to fully explain the phenomenon 
under study (Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987). 
The aim is to provide critical tests (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Laka-
tos, 1970; Mayo, 2018; Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001; Platt, 
1964; Popper, 1959/2002) that maximize the yield of scientific 
knowledge from the investigation. The present effort complements 
broader calls to engage in “theory pruning” by testing competing the-
ories against one another (Aguinis, Pierce, Bosco, & Muslin, 2009; 
Kluger & Tikochinsky, 2001) in order to reduce the dense theoretical 
landscape of the sciences (Hambrick, 2007; Leavitt, Mitchell, & Peter-
son, 2010). As previous commentators have noted, “one has a much 
greater likelihood of making important knowledge advances to theory 
and practice if the study is designed so that it juxtaposes and compares 
competing plausible explanations of the phenomenon being investi-
gated” (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006, p. 814), and “The greatest sci-
entific value emerges when at least two models are specified 
representing competing conceptualizations and one emerges the stron-
gest” (Vandenberg & Grelle, 2008). 
2. Implicit puritanism 
Scholars across fields have traced aspects of contemporary U.S. cul-
ture to the nation’s history of religious migration (Baker, 2005; de 
Tocqueville, 1840/1990; Lipset, 1996; Schafer, 1991; Voss, 1993). 
Among the New England region’s earliest European settlers were devout 
Puritan-Protestants fleeing religious persecution in England. Although 
eventually dwarfed numerically by settlers seeking economic opportu-
nities, these early colonists had a disproportionate influence on the 
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cultural values of the emerging nation. This is analogous to founder 
effects in organizations (Schein, 1990; Weeks, 2004) and biology (Mayr, 
1942, 1954; Thompson, 1978): the earliest members of a group may 
strongly impact the characteristics and behaviors of later generations of 
members. Consider for instance that the Southern culture of honor in the 
United States can be traced back to settlement from herding commu-
nities in the United Kingdom, where a reputation for violent retribution 
served as a deterrent against theft of one’s flock (Nisbett & Cohen, 
1996). 
Historical patterns of religious migration may be one reason why the 
United States today remains deeply religious and traditional despite 
sharing in the economic growth that has contributed to the seculariza-
tion of other Western countries (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005). The values of contemporary Americans with regards to sexuality, 
suicide, divorce, and abortion resemble prior generations much more so 
than in ostensibly similar nations such as the United Kingdom, Canada, 
and Australia. A related legacy of America’s Puritan-Protestant heritage 
may be a distinctive orientation towards work (Poehlman, 2007; Uhl-
mann et al., 2008, 2009, 2011). Although most of the world’s faiths 
moralize sexuality, Calvinist Protestantism is distinctive in the religious 
significance accorded to everyday labor. Theologian John Calvin 
believed that material wealth accumulated meritoriously through hard 
work indicated that a person was among God’s chosen (Weber, 1904/ 
1958). Other national cultures encourage long work hours out of secular 
concerns such as duty to family or country; the Protestant work ethic is 
truly special in linking work to divine salvation. 
These unique historical and religious roots hold continuing relevance 
in part due to the unconscious internalization and operation of pervasive 
cultural mores. Dual process models propose that in addition to explicit, 
deliberatively endorsed attitudes and beliefs, people also have implicit, 
automatic associations that they may not consciously recognize 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Whereas 
explicit beliefs are at least somewhat responsive to logical argumenta-
tion, automatic associations are ingrained by the broader culture or 
other environmental conditioning (Banaji, 2001; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 
2006). As a result, implicit associations and explicit beliefs can diverge 
sharply (Nosek, 2005). For instance, even individuals who deliberately 
reject pernicious stereotypes about Black criminality nonetheless asso-
ciate Black targets with crime more so than White targets (Correll, Park, 
Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Greenwald, Oakes, & Hoffman, 2003). 
Without drawing any moral comparison between racism and religion, a 
similar divergence may come into play with regard to Americans’ work 
and sex morality. Even non-Protestant and non-religious Americans 
may, by virtue of their exposure to U.S. culture, unconsciously absorb 
associations based in traditional Puritan-Protestant values. At times, 
these associations lead contemporary Americans to show some of the 
same tendencies as the Puritan colonists. This includes intuitively con-
demning sexual promiscuity, lauding individuals who work in the 
absence of any material need to do so, and working harder on an 
assigned task when thoughts about religion are accessible. 
The theory of Implicit Puritanism further expects Americans to link 
work and sex values together in an overarching ethos. Although many 
faiths draw an association between sexual restraint and divine purity, 
Protestantism is distinct in also placing work in the realm of the divine. 
Via the principle of cognitive balance (Greenwald et al., 2002; Heider, 
1958), their mutual link with divine salvation forges a unique connec-
tion between Puritan sex values and the Protestant work ethic in the 
minds of Americans. As a result, thoughts or judgments related to hard 
work activate inferences and values related to sexuality, and vice versa. 
Implicit Puritanism theory thus seeks to bridge prior cultural ana-
lyses of the United States (de Tocqueville, 1840/1990; Lipset, 1996) 
with theoretical and empirical work on implicit social cognition as 
applied to unconscious cultural stereotyping (Greenwald & Banaji, 
1995) and principles of cognitive balance (Greenwald et al., 2002). 
Research in the social cognitive tradition suggests that because cultural 
stereotypes are ingrained and operate unconsciously, they often affect 
the judgments and behaviors of consciously egalitarian and consciously 
inegalitarian individuals to similar degrees. Critically to Implicit Puri-
tanism theory, because the effects of the Puritan-Protestant heritage of 
the U.S. are held to be pervasive and unconsciously transmitted, de-
mographic differences based on consciously endorsed religion (i.e., 
whether the person is a Protestant or not) and explicit religiosity (i.e., 
devout faith vs. atheism) should not emerge. All that should matter 
when it comes to exhibiting the predicted effects, for instance of subtly 
priming concepts related to religion (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2011), is whether the person is an American or not. The absence of any 
moderating effects of self-reported religion or religiosity in past empir-
ical studies thus goes hand in hand with a lack of evidence of conscious 
awareness (e.g., on probe questions), in supporting the original theo-
rizing (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011). Such null effects 
are also broadly consistent with research on social tuning (Sinclair, 
Dunn, & Lowery, 2005; Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005) 
and cultural transmission (Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011), which 
highlight the automatic and unreflective processes via which beliefs can 
become pervasive in a community. 
3. Key empirical evidence 
The primary empirical support for Implicit Puritanism stems from a 
series of studies comparing the responses of Americans and non- 
Americans to experimental manipulations. Although far from an 
exhaustive list of all the evidence consistent with Implicit Puritanism in 
American moral cognition, these novel experimental findings represent 
critical building blocks of the theory (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2009, 2011), capturing the unique predictions that distinguish Implicit 
Puritanism from alternative accounts of American values (e.g., Fisher, 
1989; Hofstede, 2001; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1996). 
3.1. Moralization of needless work 
Two of these key studies examined the moralization of work in the 
absence of any material need, what Snir and Harpaz (2009) refer to as 
“work devotion” (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009). In the first of 
these experiments, participants read about a postal worker who won the 
lottery and either retired early or stayed-on-the job, and was either 
relatively young (23 years of age) or comparatively older (46 years) at 
the time. Americans, but not Mexicans, particularly praised a young 
person who continued to work at a low-ranked job despite becoming a 
multi-millionaire (henceforth referred to as the “Target Age and Need-
less Work Effect”). A follow-up experiment demonstrated that intuitive 
processes underlie this pattern of judgments. American participants read 
about two potato peelers who shared a winning lottery ticket. One 
retired young, and the other continued working in the restaurant 
kitchen. Following on prior research on rational-experiential framing 
(Epstein, 1998), participants were asked for both their “intuitive, gut 
feeling” and “most rational, objective” response as to which of the two 
was the better person. Americans significantly preferred the target who 
persisted in needless work, but only in an intuitive mindset. When it 
came to their logically reasoned beliefs, Americans seemed to realize 
their gut feelings lacked justification (we will refer to this as the “Intu-
itive Mindset Effect”). 
3.2. Linking work with salvation 
Another key experiment used a priming paradigm (Bargh, 2014; 
Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979) to examine whether 
traditional Puritan-Protestant values operate outside of conscious 
awareness. Prior empirical studies suggest that direct activation of 
concepts can influence downstream judgments and behaviors absent any 
mediation by conscious intentions (see Weingarten, Hepler, Chen, 
McAdams, Yi, & Albarracín, 2016, for a meta-analysis). A priming 
manipulation was therefore employed to test the hypothesized implicit 
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link between work and divine salvation in American minds (Uhlmann 
et al., 2011). Participants from the United States and Canada first 
completed a sentence unscrambling puzzle in which either words rep-
resenting salvation (e.g., redeem, divine, heaven) or similarly valanced 
concepts unrelated to religion (e.g., flowers, rainbow, happiness) were 
subtly embedded. After completing one of the two versions of the 
scrambled-sentences task, all participants were presented with an 
anagram task framed as a work assignment. American, but not Canadian 
participants responded to activation of religious concepts with improved 
work performance (i.e., greater number of anagrams solved; we will 
refer to this as the “Salvation Prime Effect”). 
3.3. Linking work and sex values 
The final study key to the theory of Implicit Puritanism provides 
evidence of the hypothesized link between work and sex morality in 
American moral cognition. This experiment adapted a false memory 
paradigm from cognitive psychology (Barrett & Keil, 1996) to examine 
the tacit inferences drawn about social targets. American participants 
read a series of vignettes about women and men who either upheld or 
violated traditional sex or work values (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2009). In one scenario, a high school (secondary school) student named 
Ann was described as either sexually promiscuous or abstinent. In both 
conditions, Anne scored poorly on her history quiz. After a brief dis-
tractor task, participants were tested on their memory of the vignettes. 
Embedded among the memory items were target statements that were in 
fact false (i.e., did not reflect the information provided). Yet at the same 
time, they represented inferences flowing from the assumption that a 
good person is both sexually restrained and hard-working, whereas a 
bad person is neither. As hypothesized, Americans falsely remembered 
sexually promiscuous individuals as lazy, and vice versa. For example, 
when Anne was promiscuous, participants were significantly more likely 
to misremember her having failed to study hard for the quiz. (This 
overall pattern of results, obtained across four such scenarios, is 
henceforth referred to as the “Tacit Inferences Effect”). 
Across each of these investigations, individual differences in religi-
osity and religion (of particular interest, whether the research partici-
pant was a Protestant or not) did not significantly moderate the effects. 
Not only devout American Protestants, but also members of other reli-
gious faiths and even atheists appear to moralize work and sexuality in a 
manner consistent with the faith of the early Puritan-Protestant colo-
nists. This is consistent with the idea that such beliefs are implicitly 
absorbed from the broader culture context of the United States (Boyd 
et al., 2011; Sinclair et al., 2005), rather than deliberatively chosen 
through a process of careful reflection. This streak of Implicit Puritan-
ism, the original research suggests, coexists with the multifold other 
influences on American culture over the centuries. 
4. Alternative accounts of work and sex morality 
Consistent with the creative destruction approach to replication 
(Tierney et al., in press), rather than re-examine the predictions of Im-
plicit Puritanism theory in isolation, we will leverage the same data 
collections to simultaneously test other theories. Some of these alter-
native accounts of work and sex morality are competing, or in other 
words formulate predictions in direct opposition to those tested in the 
original research (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011). Others 
are potentially reconcilable with the original theorizing, positing 
individual-differences or demographic moderators that might coexist 
with the basic patterns of effects core to Implicit Puritanism. 
4.1. False positives 
The false positives perspective adopts a skeptical stance towards the 
original studies, which were conducted prior to the crisis of confidence 
and subsequent methodological reforms in the field of psychology 
(Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018). Like most research in-
vestigations conducted before 2011, they were underpowered to detect 
the reported effects (Fanelli, 2010; Ioannidis, 2005) and the analyses 
were not pre-registered (Van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Wagen-
makers et al., 2012). In addition, one key experiment— the salvation 
prime study— relied on nonconscious priming methods (Bargh et al., 
1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979), which have been subject to a wave of 
replication failures (e.g., Caruso, Shapira, & Landy, 2017; Doyen, Klein, 
Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; 
Klein et al., 2014; McCarthy et al., 2018; O’Donnell et al., 2018; Olsson- 
Collentine, Wicherts, & van Assen, in press; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 
2012; Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 2013; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015). 
Thus, the original Implicit Puritanism findings may simply reflect false 
positive effects (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). It may not be 
the case that needless work elicits intuitive admiration, religion primes 
hard work, and work and sex morality are implicitly linked— either in 
the United States or in other societies. If the original effects are false 
positives, effect sizes should be negligible across cultures, and variability 
across locations (e.g., different laboratories, regions, and nations) 
should not exceed what would be expected based on chance (Klein, 
Vianello, Hasselman, et al., 2018, 2014; McCarthy et al., 2018; Olsson- 
Collentine, et al., in press). 
4.2. Religious differences 
Another possibility is that the original effects hold only for some 
Americans, but not others. It seems straightforward that traditional 
Puritan-Protestant moral attitudes towards work and sexuality would be 
most evident among individuals who are themselves devout, practicing 
Protestants. That an implicit association is pervasive in a culture does 
not preclude individual differences, such that people who deliberatively 
endorse the association show its effects most strongly (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Nosek, 2005). Notably, U.S. Protestants and Cath-
olics exhibit important differences in the tendency to behave imper-
sonally at work, including on indirect and implicit measures (Sanchez- 
Burks, 2002, 2005; Sanchez-Burks & Lee, 2007). 
Although the original research on Implicit Puritanism obtained no 
support for religion and religiosity as moderators of the reported effects, 
methodological limitations warrant caution. First, the original studies 
relied on relatively small samples, and may have failed to detect the 
signal of important moderators amid the noise caused by imprecise es-
timates. Second, only a single-item assessment of religiosity was used, 
making it impossible to calculate the reliability of the measure. The 
present replications therefore used a validated multi-item measure of 
religiosity (Koenig & Büssing, 2010) and collected thousands rather than 
hundreds of participants to allow for more confident conclusions. 
4.3. Regional differences 
A wealth of evidence indicates that variability within different re-
gions of a society can be just as meaningful as cross-national compari-
sons (Cohen & Varnum, 2016; Muthukrishna et al., 2020). Historical 
patterns of rice cultivation, which requires high levels of cooperation, 
predict contemporary endorsement of collectivism within China (Tal-
helm et al., 2014), and U.S. states vary in their individualism and tight 
adherence to norms (Harrington & Gelfand, 2014; Vandello & Cohen, 
1999). Regions of Japan settled under frontier conditions are charac-
terized by levels of individualism comparable to those in the United 
States (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006). And as 
noted earlier, Northern and Southern U.S. states differ dramatically in 
their norms regarding insult-based violence (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). 
Influential historical scholarship proposes that four major regions of 
the United States were shaped in distinct ways by migration from 
different populations within Great Britain, or “Albion” (Fisher, 1989). 
The religious values of the Pilgrims and Puritans most strongly influ-
enced the New England region, English gentry played an important role 
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in the plantation culture of the South, Quakers shaped the industrial 
culture of the Midwest, and Scotch-Irish migration contributed to the 
ranch culture of the American West. In contrast to the theory of Implicit 
Puritanism, the regional folkways perspective predicts that Puritan- 
Protestant moral intuitions should manifest themselves primary in the 
New England states, the U.S. region most influenced by Puritan 
migration. 
In the original research (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 
2011) regional comparisons within the United States based on state of 
origin yielded only null results, yet were based on small samples of 
participants and potentially underpowered to detect real differences. 
Another limitation of the original investigations is that the U.S. samples 
were recruited primarily, although not exclusively, from the New En-
gland region. Several experiments were conducted with undergraduates 
at Yale university, most of whom were studying outside their home state, 
in contrast to a state school which would be attended mostly by locally 
based individuals. Nonetheless, these Yale students had at a minimum a 
few months of exposure to New England culture, if not several years or 
more. Such samples make it more difficult to tease apart the effects of 
regional cultural mores and those of the broader U.S. culture. Although 
perhaps doubtful, one cannot rule out the possibility that Yale students 
from other areas of the U.S. only exhibited Implicit Puritanism due to 
their recent exposure to New England culture. 
The replications therefore recruited large samples of respondents 
from both the New England states and other U.S. states to allow for a 
fairer test of regional variability. The “Albion’s seed” hypothesis sug-
gests the effects outlined by Implicit Puritanism theory should be 
confined largely to the New England region, rather than characteristic of 
the nation as a whole. This is again in contrast to the theory of Implicit 
Puritanism, which proposes that traditional Puritan-Protestant work and 
sex morality characterizes U.S. culture in general– i.e., not only New 
England but all the U.S. states and regions. Implicit Puritanism is 
postulated to have seeped into the broader American culture, not just 
New England culture (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011). 
Further, rather than being conditioned in a matter of months, the un-
derlying associations with work and sexuality are thought to be social-
ized from a relatively early age (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 
2011), again similar to cultural stereotypes of groups (Banaji, Baron, 
Dunham, & Olson, 2008; Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dunham, Baron, & 
Banaji, 2006, 2008, 2016). Our large-sample replications provided 
much greater power to detect regional differences than in the original 
studies, providing direct tests of the opposing predictions of the Implicit 
Puritanism and regional folkways accounts of American values. 
4.4. Social class differences 
Experimental, survey, and archival research converges in identifying 
profound differences in values and cognitive tendencies based on social 
class (Cohen & Varnum, 2016). Relative to high socioeconomic status 
(SES) persons from the same society, low-SES individuals are more likely 
to take into account situational constraints when forming judgments of 
others; valorize steadfastness in the face of adversity and obedience to 
authorities over personal agency; and are more relational and family- 
oriented (Snibbe & Markus, 2005; Stephens, Fryberg, & Markus, 2011; 
Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, Johnson, & Covarrubias, 2012; Varnum, Na, 
Murata, & Kitayama, 2012). Such demographic differences have been 
observed not only within the United States, but also other cultures, 
among these Italy, Poland, the Ukraine, Russia, and Japan (Grossmann 
& Varnum, 2011; Kohn, 1969; Kohn et al., 2002; Kohn, Naoi, Schoen-
bach, Schooler, & Slomczynski, 1990). 
In surveys, working class people generally report viewing work as a 
job and means to an end— to them, the purpose of work is to earn wages 
to support themselves and their family. In contrast, middle and upper- 
class respondents are more likely to see work as an end unto itself and 
in the context of a long-term career (Argyle, 1994; Corney & Richards, 
2005; King & Bu, 2005; Williams, 2012; cf. Adigun, 1997). This suggests 
that within any given culture, indices of social class (i.e., educational 
attainment and income) should be associated with intuitively moralizing 
needless work, as in the Target Age and Needless Work effect, and 
Intuitive Mindset effect. The social class perspective makes no strong 
predictions for the Tacit Inferences or Salvation Prime effects. However, 
the strong version of the theory, in which social class differences 
exclusively drive moral cognition, anticipates null findings. The litera-
ture on class differentiation in human societies provides no basis to 
hypothesize an implicit link between work and sex values, or an auto-
matic association between work and divine salvation. 
4.5. Self-expression values 
Cross-national data from the World Values Survey identifies two 
primary dimensions of culture: 1) traditional vs. secular-rational values, 
and 2) survival vs. self-expression values (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). Traditional societies emphasize the importance of reli-
gious faith and absolute standards for morality, and people tend to be 
opposed to divorce, euthanasia, and abortion; in secular societies, fewer 
people self-identify as devoutly religious and such practices are more 
socially acceptable. In cultures high in self-expression values, in-
dividuals pursue their own individual happiness and personal fulfill-
ment, whereas in survival cultures economic security is the overriding 
goal. 
High national scores on self-expression values tend to be associated 
with “work devotion,” in other words perceiving work to be an enjoy-
able pursuit above and beyond money, whereas survival values are 
linked to “work investment,” or seeing work as a means of earning a 
living (Snir & Harpaz, 2009). There are no major differences between 
the United States and other nations in the English-speaking cultural 
cluster in terms of self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
This leads to a predicted pattern of cross-national similarities and dif-
ferences in results that deviates sharply from the Implicit Puritanism 
perspective. Based on their scores on self-expression values, participants 
from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia should all intu-
itively moralize work, and to similar degrees. In contrast, participants 
from survival-oriented societies, such as India, should view work ar-
rangements as instrumental and therefore not valorize needless work. 
The Inglehart and Welzel (2005) cultural framework provides no reason 
to expect the Tacit Inferences or Salvation Prime effects to emerge in any 
culture. 
4.6. Explicit American Exceptionalism 
Another distinct possibility is that the originally hypothesized cul-
tural differences in work and sex values (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann 
et al., 2009, 2011) are in fact more explicit than implicit. Such deep- 
seated cultural beliefs may have a strong intuitive component, in that 
associated judgments appear suddenly in consciousness without much 
subjective experience of deliberation (Haidt, 2001). However, they 
could still be introspectively accessible and consciously reportable. As 
noted earlier, the results of cross-national surveys such as the World 
Values Survey (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), Hofstede’s classic study of 
IBM employees (Hofstede, 2001), and GLOBE survey (Dorfman, Hanges, 
& Brodbeck, 2004), already capture the strikingly religious and tradi-
tional values of the United States. Comparisons of societal institutions 
and work practices provide converging evidence of American excep-
tionalism (Baker, 2005; Landes, 1998; Lipset, 1996). The valorization of 
long work hours in America, and conservative views on sexuality, may 
be reflected in emotional gut responses that are fully verbalizable and 
conscious. 
Notably, many Americans explicitly endorse the Protestant work 
ethic (PWE) on self-report scales, agreeing to items like “Most people 
who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy” (Furnham, 1989; Katz & 
Hass, 1988; Mirels & Garrett, 1971). The PWE correlates with attitudes 
towards social groups such as the unemployed, Black Americans, and the 
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obese; as well as views on policies such as affirmative action and welfare 
(Furnham, 1982, 1989; Katz & Hass, 1988; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). 
However, this prior scholarship does not directly predict that such 
complex ideologies will operate unconsciously in the manner suggested 
by research on implicit social cognition (Bargh, 2014; Bargh et al., 
1996). Americans are perhaps exceptional in intuitively lauding in-
dividuals who engage in needless work (Target Age and Needless Work 
effect and Intuitive Mindset effect), and may intuitively infer that hard- 
working individuals are sexually chaste and vice versa (Tacit Inferences 
effect), all judgments flowing from their explicit endorsement of the 
Protestant work ethic. However, merely priming words related to reli-
gion will not necessarily have the same impact on downstream judg-
ments and behaviors (e.g., Salvation Prime effect). 
Importantly, prior scholarship in fields such as sociology, political 
science, and cultural history identifies consciously self-reported cultural 
differences in values, but is largely silent on whether or not traditional 
American values further operate unconsciously. The Explicit American 
Exceptionalism alternative theory tested here, in which traditional work 
and sex values are observable in consciously self-reported judgments, 
but not on implicit indicators, is suggested by the recent wave of repli-
cation failures for nonconscious priming effects (Caruso et al., 2017; 
Doyen et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2014; McCarthy et al., 
2018; O’Donnell et al., 2018; Olsson-Collentine, et al., in press; Pashler 
et al., 2012; Pashler et al., 2013; Rohrer et al., 2015). In other words, the 
Explicit American Exceptionalism account places great stock in earlier 
multi-disciplinary work on U.S. cultural mores, which relied heavily on 
high powered cross-national surveys (e.g., Baker, 2005; Lipset, 1996; 
Schafer, 1991), and has little faith in small sample experiments on im-
plicit priming (Bargh, 2014; Bargh et al., 1996; Poehlman, 2007; Uhl-
mann et al., 2011). However, that religious and work values may be 
prime-able in experimental settings and exert unconscious influences on 
judgments and behaviors does not challenge the work of Lipset (1996), 
Baker (2005), and other scholars of U.S. exceptionalism in fields outside 
of psychology. 
4.7. General moralization of work and sex 
A final possibility is that the key experimental effects outlined earlier 
(Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2001) may be exhibited not 
only by Americans, but members of other cultures as well. Historically, 
moralization and regulation of sexual behavior is characteristic of most 
religious faiths and societies (Foucault, 1978; Gruen & Panichas, 1997; 
Peiss, Simmons, & Padgug, 1989). A general distaste for individuals who 
under-contribute to work tasks is suggested by research on costly pun-
ishment of defectors and free riders (Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & 
Nowak, 2008; Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), and may have 
evolutionary roots. The original Implicit Puritanism studies provide 
preliminary evidence of cross-cultural differences, but with samples too 
small to draw strong conclusions. Higher powered tests may be neces-
sary to detect the implicit moralization of work and sex across human 
societies. 
Notably, neither the original studies nor the present replication 
initiative examined whether moral intuitions related to work and 
sexuality are potentially useful in identifying social targets with strong 
moral identities (Aquino, Freeman, Reed II, Lim, & Felps, 2009; Aquino 
& Reed II, 2002). Sexually restricted and hard-working individuals may 
or may not actually be more “moral” on other dimensions— such as 
empathy, generosity, fairness, or trustworthiness— and the strength of 
such relationships could also vary by culture (Weeden & Kurzban, 
2013). Even if there is an ecological relationship between traditional 
Puritan morality and ethical behavior more generally, it is likely to be 
far from perfect, and also imperfectly aligned with social inferences and 
perceptions (Moon, Krems, & Cohen, 2018). The original Implicit Pu-
ritanism studies dealt with social judgments, not social reality. The 
present replications sought to reproduce the original results, and also 
test for alternative patterns in social judgments predicted by competing 
theories. The potential general moralization of work and sexuality 
across cultures is one of these alternative possibilities. The validity or 
rationality of such inferences is a fascinating question that will have to 
be left to follow-up research. 
5. Overview of the present investigations 
These novel data collections used the creative destruction approach 
to replication to further our theoretical understanding of moral values 
related to work and sexuality. A set of key effects originally predicted by 
the theory of Implicit Puritanism, but potentially explicable under other 
frameworks, were systematically re-examined. The replications 
occurred across six nations (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, 
Republic of Ireland, Canada, and India), oversampling the particularly 
relevant New England region of the United States. As in the original 
research (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2011), data were collected 
both online and in research laboratories. 
The original Implicit Puritanism studies adhered to pre-2011 stan-
dards for experimental research, in that studies were not pre-registered 
and sample sizes were moderate (Nelson et al., 2018). Indeed, histori-
cally only 8% of studies in the field of psychology have achieved 80% 
power to detect the reported effects (Stanley, Carter, & Doucouliagos, 
2018). In the replication initiative, planned sample sizes totaled many 
times those of the original experiments, allowing for more precise effect 
size estimates as well as better powered tests of potential moderators— 
such as regional variation within the United States, as well as individual 
differences in religion and religiosity. This allowed us to empirically 
adjudicate between the Implicit Puritanism, false positives, religious 
differences, regional variability, social class, self-expression values, 
explicit American moral exceptionalism, and general moralization ac-
counts of work and sex values. We considered both the strong version of 
each theory, in which its predictions hold to the exclusion of all others, 
as well as whether multiple theories in combination best explained the 
results.1 All measures and manipulations in this research are disclosed, 
and sample sizes were determined in advance. The complete study 
materials are provided in Supplements 1–2, the preregistered analysis 
plan in Supplement 3 and https://osf.io/xwu4v/, and the datafiles at 
(Study 1: https://osf.io/k236g/, Study 2: https://osf.io/687h5/). Our 
hope is that this initiative will not only shed novel light on cultural 
values, but also serve as a model for future efforts to assess the repli-
cability of published findings and explanatory power of competing 
theories. 
6. Study 1 
This large-scale online data collection attempted to replicate the 
target age and needless work effect, intuitive mindset effect, and tacit 
inferences effect (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009) across four 
nations. A professional survey firm, PureProfile, was used to recruit 
large samples from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, 
while sampling as evenly as feasible from the constituent regions of each 
country with the exception of oversampling from the theoretically 
important New England region of the United States. Amazon’s 
1 The ultimate origins of cultural values related to work and sexuality are 
difficult to test empirically. Adaptive pressures may have led human groups to 
regulate sexual behavior, engage in costly punishment of free riders, and confer 
status on over-contributors to group efforts. Such morally charged reactions 
could also reflect more proximal influences such as a society’s history of eco-
nomic activity (Talhelm et al., 2014) or religious migrations (Fisher, 1989; 
Lipset, 1996). Far more tractable is assessing what values predominate in a 
society, explicitly and implicitly, and whether they can be situationally acti-
vated or primed. These individual-level outputs, predicted based on the ex-
pected influence of past events on present day social cognition, are the focus of 
the present research. 
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Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, 
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) was used to collect data from further groups 
of Indian and USA participants (see also Uhlmann, Heaphy, Ashford, 
Zhu, & Sanchez-Burks, 2013). This online microwork website provided 
an efficient means of recruiting English speakers from both a survival- 
oriented society (India) and personal fulfillment-oriented society (U. 
S.) in order to test the self-expression values hypothesis. 
Notably, we held methods and materials constant across these pop-
ulations to allow for direct replication (Simons, 2014). One can also 
make iterative modifications to the materials across research sites, 
assessing mediating states each time, in an effort to achieve psycho-
logical rather than methodological equivalence (Fabrigar, Wegener, & 
Petty, in press; Schwarz & Strack, 2014; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). 
However, in the original studies the theoretical underlying processes are 
nonconscious and were inferred rather than measured (Poehlman, 2007; 
Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011), seriously complicating such an approach. 
As the original studies sampled some of the same populations (e.g., USA, 
UK, and Canadian participants) without modifications across sites, the 
present replication initiative did the same. Future research using a 
creative destruction approach to replication may prioritize either 
methodological or psychological equivalence. 
6.1. Methods 
6.1.1. Participants 
PureProfile sample. The professional survey firm PureProfile was used to 
recruit participants (total N = 4098) from Australia (24.67%), the 
United Kingdom (23.43%), and the United States (51.90%) while 
oversampling the New England states (Maine, Vermont, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut; 47.58% of the USA 
sample). Thus, the PureProfile sample was split more or less equally 
between Australia, the U.K., USA New England states, and USA non- 
New-England states. 
Amazon Mechanical Turk sample. MTurk was used to collect data from a 
further 2036 Indian (49%) and USA (51%) participants. The MTurk data 
collection in the USA had a smaller percentage of respondents from the 
New England region (only 4.3%), limiting our ability to test regional 
variability. 
Demographic information for each major sample for Study 1 is 
summarized in Table S14-1 in Supplement 14. 
6.1.2. Design 
The three experiments appeared in counterbalanced order, with 
assignment to condition within each study randomized. The Lottery 
Winner study featured a 2 (work status: retired or continues working) x 
2 (age: 23 years or 46 years) x participant nationality between-subjects 
design. The Intuitive Mindset study included a within-subjects factor 
comparing participants’ preferences in the intuitive framing and logical 
framing conditions, with participant nationality a between-subjects 
factor. The Tacit Inferences study had two between-subjects condi-
tions manipulating whether targets uphold or violate traditional mo-
rality, with participant nationality again serving as the second between- 
subjects factor. At the end of the study, after exposure to the manipu-
lations and completing the dependent measures, all participants filled 
out individual differences and demographic measures. 
6.1.3. Materials and procedure 
In all of the present data collections, we employed a variety of 
safeguards to maintain data quality. The cover page for all our online 
experiments included a captcha item to avoid contamination by bots, 
and we further screened out participants with duplicate GPS co-
ordinates. For the MTurk data collections for Study 1 we recruited only 
participants with a 99% acceptance rate and >1000 hits approved. 
Finally, we excluded participants with <5 years of English experience or 
who failed an instructional manipulation check from all analyses (see 
Supplements 3 and 10). 
Lottery winner study. Participants read a vignette about Sarah, a postal 
worker who wins the lottery and either decides to retire immediately or 
to continue in her job. Depending on the experimental condition, she 
was either 23 or 46 years of age. Participants provided their assessment 
of Sarah’s moral character (1 = very bad, 7 = very good). 
Intuitive mindset study. Participants were presented with a scenario 
about Robert and John, two potato peelers who shared a winning lottery 
ticket. Robert immediately chose to retire young, whereas John 
continued working peeling potatoes. In the intuitive mindset frame, 
participants were asked for their “intuitive, gut feeling” as to whom is 
the better person (1 = Robert is a much better person than John, 7 = John is 
a much better person than Robert). In the logical mindset frame, they were 
asked for their “rational, objective judgment” to the same question 
(Epstein, 1998). 
Tacit inferences study. In this experiment, participants were first 
informed that “You will first read stories, then answer some questions 
about what you remember about the content of the stories” (Barrett & 
Keil, 1996). They then read four vignettes, each featuring a target person 
who either conforms to or transgresses traditional work or sex morality. 
The two scenarios in which the protagonist clearly violates or upholds 
traditional sex norms also contain ambiguous information about the 
person’s work ethic. At the same time, the two scenarios in which the 
protagonists clearly exhibit a strong work ethic or not further contain 
ambiguous information about her or his sexual behavior. 
For example, participants read about a character name Julia, who 
either worked long hours at her job or was unemployed and not actively 
looking for a job. In both conditions the vignette went on to indicate that 
Julia attended a local party and stayed overnight. Participants were then 
presented with a set of distractor questions prompting open-ended 
written responses (e.g., “Do you think the author of the story was 
older than 30 or younger than 30?”). Finally, they were tested on their 
recall of the scenario using eight true/false questions. Embedded among 
seven filler true/false items was the critical target item, “Julia slept with 
the host of last week’s party.” An intuitive link between work and sex 
morality is reflected in falsely remembering the vignette as stating that 
Julia had sex only in the condition in which she was previously 
described as lazy. 
The following measures were administered after the key manipula-
tions and dependent measures. 
Religiosity. Our multi-item measure of religiosity was the Duke Univer-
sity Religion Index (DUREL; Koenig & Büssing, 2010), a validated five- 
item measure widely used across fields. Example items include “My 
religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life” 
and “In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine (i.e., God)” (1 =
definitely not true, 5 = definitely true of me). Also included was the single 
item religiosity item from the original Implicit Puritanism studies 
(Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2019, 2011), which simply states “I 
consider myself to be” and provides a numeric scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all religious) to 7 (very religious). Responses on the numeric scale 
effectively complete the statement in the initial question—for instance, 
choosing “7” indicates “I consider myself to be… very religious.” 
Protestant work ethic (PWE). The PWE scale from Katz and Hass (1988) 
is an 11-item questionnaire including statements such as “A distaste for 
hard work usually reflects a weakness of character” and “Most people 
who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy” (1 = strongly disagree, 6 =
strongly agree). 
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Demographics. Participants completed demographic measures including 
their religion (Protestant, Catholic, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, atheist, 
agnostic, other), religious denomination within Protestantism if appli-
cable (Adventist, Anabaptist, Anglican, Baptist, Calvinist, Lutheran, 
Methodist, Pentecostal, other), place of worship if any, political orien-
tation (1 = very progressive/left-wing, 7 = very conservative/right-wing), 
political party identification (free response), gender, age, ethnicity, 
country and state/region they are currently primarily based in, country 
of birth, country of citizenship, years spent in the United States, state of 
origin with the USA if relevant, years of experience with the English 
language, occupation, income, personal educational level, and educa-
tion level of most highly educated parent. 
Awareness probe. In contrast to the priming paradigm used in Study 2 
below, participants’ level of awareness of the manipulations (e.g., target 
work behavior or age) should not theoretically interfere with the effects 
in Study 1. However, an exploratory free response item asked “What do 
you think this survey was about?” 
Attention check. An instructional attention check told participants to 
“please select strongly disagree” and provided a scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Participants who failed this check 
were excluded from all analyses. 
6.2. Results 
Mixed models were conducted using the condition values as the fixed 
effect, while using the region as the random effect. Thereafter, F sta-
tistics were derived from the ANOVA produced by these models. 
6.2.1. Needless work study: MTurk sample 
A 2 (target age: 23 or 46 years) x 2 (target works vs. retires) ANOVA 
revealed a statistically significant main effect of target age, F(1, 2029) =
4.43, p = .04, d = − 0.093, main effect of work status, F(1, 2032) =
220.53, p < .001, d = 0.65, and two-way interaction between age and 
work status, F(1, 2027.3) = 4.596, p = .03, d = 0.095 (see Table 1). The 
target received more moral praise when she continued working 
compared to when she retired, and when she was older rather than 
young. Further, reactions to a lottery winner who continued working vs. 
retired depended on her age. 
Although target age and work status interacted significantly, 
unpacking this interaction revealed a markedly different pattern of re-
sults than in the original Implicit Puritanism research. As per the pre- 
registered analysis plan, the key effect of primary interest for the 
replication was the main effect of target age (23 years or 46 years) 
within the target works condition. Contrary to the original research 
(Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009) the young target who 
continued to work did not receive more favorable moral evaluations 
than an older target who continued to work, F(1, 1013.74) = 0.035, p =
.851, d = − 0.012. Instead, the two-way interaction was driven by the 
effect of target age within the retires condition, such that the younger 
retiree was rated more negatively than the older retiree, F(1, 1009.91) 
= 8.871, p = .003, d = − 0.187. 
We next examined potential moderating effects of country, focusing 
again on the pre-registered key effect of interest (i.e., target age effect 
within the target works condition). A 2 (23 or 46 years) x 2 (India vs. 
USA) ANOVA revealed no significant interaction, F(1, 1018) = 0.268, p 
= .605, d = − 0.032, indicating no evidence of moderation by participant 
nation. Further, testing for the key effect separately by country (USA and 
India) revealed no effect of target age within the works condition in 
either the India sample, F(1, 492.32) = 0.058, p = .81, d = 0.022, or USA 
sample, F(1, 523) = 0.3, p = .584, d = − 0.048. New England region 
likewise failed to moderate the effect of target age within the works 
condition, F(1, 1018) = 0.678, p = .411, d = 0.052. 
Finally, we examined theoretically relevant individual differences 
moderators. Neither the single item measure of religiosity, F(1, 999) =
0.001, p = .979, d = − 0.002, nor the DUREL religiosity scale F(1, 1018) 
= 0.251, p = .616, d = 0.031, nor participant education level F(1, 
985.95) = 1.716, p = .191, d = − 0.083, nor the Protestant Work Ethic F 
(1, 1012.15) = 0.167, p = .683, d = 0.026, nor self-reported religion 
(Protestant or not) F(1, 1016.62) = 3.4, p = .065, d = 0.116, moderated 
moral judgments of a target who works based on her age. 
6.2.2. Needless work study: PureProfile sample 
A 2 (target age) x 2 (work status) ANOVA revealed a nonsignificant 
main effect of target age, F(1, 4079) = 3.50, p = .06, d = − 0.056, a 
statistically significant main effect of work status, F(1, 4082) = 423.24, 
p < .001, d = 0.367, and a significant interaction between age and work 
status, F(1, 4077) = 16.15, p < .001, d = 0.125. With the exception of the 
main effect of age not reaching statistical significance, this overall 
pattern paralleled the results reported above for the MTurk sample (see 
Table 1). Unpacking the target age * work status interaction, the young 
target who stayed on the job after winning the lottery received similar 
evaluations to the older target who continued to work, F(1, 2052.56) =
1.887, p = .17, d = 0.061. Instead, the two-way interaction was driven 
by a target age effect within the retires condition, with the younger 
retiree rated significantly less favorably than the older retiree, F(1, 
2019.88) = 17.675, p < .001, d = − 0.1871. 
With regard to the moderating effects of nation, there was no sig-
nificant difference between the USA and the other two countries 
(Australia & UK), F(1, 2061) = 0.303, p = .582, d = 0.024, the USA vs. 
Australia, F(1, 1547) = 0.299, p = .585, d = 0.028, or the USA vs U.K., F 
(1, 1572) = 0.123, p = .725, d = 0.018. Further, the target age and 
needless work effect was not significant within the USA sample, F(1, 
1055.87) = 1.959, p = .162, d = 0.086, Australia sample, F(1, 487) =
0.086, p = .77, d = 0.027, or UK sample, F(1, 514) = 0.266, p = .606, d 
= 0.046. New England region again failed to emerge as a moderator F(1, 
2045.35) = 0.002, p = .97, d = 0.001. The individual differences mea-
sures likewise failed to moderate, among these the single item measure 
of religiosity, F(1, 2048.17) = 0.482, p = .488, d = 0.031, DUREL reli-
giosity scale, F(1, 2056.41) = 0.308, p = .579, d = 0.025, Protestant 
religion, F(1, 2048.9) = 1.067, p = .302, d = 0.046, education level, F(1, 
1938.1) = 0.436, p = .509, d = − 0.03, and PWE scores, F(1, 2054.24) =
3.486, p = .062, d = 0.082. 
6.2.3. Intuitive mindset study: MTurk sample 
A within-subjects ANOVA comparing intuitive and deliberative re-
sponses as to whom was the better person revealed a significant overall 
Table 1 
Moral judgments of a lottery winner who works vs. retires and is relatively young or older.   
India MTurk USA MTurk USA PPa Australia PP UK PP 









































Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. 
a PP denotes PureProfile sample. 
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effect F(1, 2033.89) = 27.38, p < .001, d = 0.232. Specifically, partic-
ipants expressed a preference for the worker over the retiree that was 
stronger on the intuitive mindset item than on the rational mindset item. 
A significant interaction between country (USA vs. India) and intu-
itive vs. rational responses emerged, F(1, 2031.84) = 45.027, p < .001, d 
= 0.2977, such that the intuitive mindset effect was stronger among 
American participants than Indian participants (Fig. 1). The difference 
between intuitive and rational responses was clearly observed in the 
USA sample, F(1, 1033.77) = 76.019, p < .001, d = 0.543, but not the 
India sample, F(1, 998) = 1.105, p = .293, d = − 0.067. New England 
region did not moderate the results, F(1, 2033.61) = 2.009, p = .156, d 
= − 0.0623. 
Self-identified religion (Protestant or not), F(1, 2029.61) = 0.263, p 
= .608, d = 0.023 did not moderate the effect. However education level, 
F(1, 1975.39) = 5.006, p = .025, d = − 0.101 did significantly moderate 
the results, such that less educated participants were more likely to 
demonstrate the intuitive mindset effect, directionally contrary to the 
expectations of the social class perspective. Highly religious individuals, 
as assessed by both the single-item measure, F(1, 1994.13) = 22.807, p 
< .001, d = − 0.214 and DUREL scale, F(1, 2031.75) = 24.758, p < .001, 
d = − 0.221, were significantly less likely to exhibit a difference between 
their intuitive and rational responses, directly opposite to the pre-
dictions of the religious differences perspective. Contrary to any of the 
theories tested, endorsement of the PWE negatively predicted exhibiting 
the intuitive mindset effect, F(1, 2033.71) = 10.17, p = .001, d =
− 0.141. As discussed below, the moderating effects of education, reli-
giosity and PWE endorsement in the MTurk sample did not replicate in 
the PureProfile sample. 
6.2.4. Intuitive mindset study: PureProfile sample 
A significant intuitive mindset effect again emerged in the Pure-
Profile sample, F(1, 4085.04) = 72.542, p < .001, d = 0.267. However, 
as seen in Fig. 1, country (USA vs. UK or Australia) did not moderate the 
effect, F(1, 4083.99) = 0.322, p = .57, d = 0.018. Further, examining 
each country separately, an intuitive mindset led to more favorable 
judgments of a target who continued to work not only in the US, F(1, 
2117.49) = 40.965, p < .001, d = 0.278, but also in the UK, F(1, 956.66) 
= 7.338, p = 0.007, d = 0.175, and Australia, F(1, 1010) = 27.352, p <
.001, d = 0.329. New England region again failed to moderate the re-
sults, F(1, 4085.82) = 0.904, p = .342, d = − 0.03. The single item 
religiosity measure, F(1, 4071.75) = 0.299, p = .584, d = − 0.017, 
DUREL religiosity scale, F(1, 4085.06) = 0.147, p = .701, d = − 0.012, 
self-identification as a Protestant, F(1, 4062.19) = 0.079, p = .778, d =
− 0.009, and the PWE, F(1, 4084.25) = 0.931, p = .335, d = − 0.031, 
failed to emerge as significant moderators. In contrast, education level 
did significantly moderate the intuitive work morality effect, F(1, 
3866.82) = 13.355, p < .001, d = 0.118, such that more educated 
participants were more likely to exhibit a difference between their 
intuitive and logical judgments. Note that the direction of moderation 
was directly opposite to that in the MTurk sample, such that these results 
are extremely mixed and equivocal, providing no overall support for the 
social class perspective. 
6.2.5. Tacit inferences study: MTurk sample 
An overall condition effect emerged such that when the target upheld 
(violated) traditional work morality, she/he was falsely remembered as 
upholding (violating) traditional sexual morality, and vice versa, F(1, 
2029.13) = 89.11, p < .001, d = 0.42. Further, a significant interaction 
with country emerged, such that this tacit inferences effect was stronger 
among American participants than Indian participants, F(1, 2027.21) =
24.882, p < .001, d = 0.222 (Fig. 2). Although there was a significant 
between-country difference, the tacit inferences effect was statistically 
significant not only in the USA, F(1, 1031.8) = 103.8, p < .001, d =
0.632, but also India, F(1, 997.03) = 10.02, p = .002, d = 0.201. In other 
words, the effect was present in both comparison countries, but rela-
tively larger in one nation (US) than in the other (India). New England 
region did not moderate the results, F(1, 2023.45) = 0.015, p = .902, d 
= − 0.006. 
The single item measure of religiosity, F(1, 1985.01) = 1.168, p =
.28, d = − 0.049, and whether the participant was of the Protestant faith 
or not, F(1, 2023.45) = 1.674, p = .196, d = 0.058, did not moderate the 
tacit inferences effect in the MTurk sample. However, the DUREL reli-
giosity scale, F(1, 2024.49) = 5.718, p = .017, d = − 0.106, and Prot-
estant Work Ethic scale, F(1, 2024.67) = 10.143, p = .001, d = − 0.142, 
did significantly moderate the effect. Surprisingly, more religious par-
ticipants on the DUREL scale, and individuals who explicitly endorsed 
the PWE, were significantly less likely to exhibit false memories 
consistent with an intuitive link between work and sex morality. These 
results are inconsistent with any of the theories considered here, and as 
noted below failed to replicate in the PureProfile sample. 
6.2.6. Tacit inferences study: PureProfile sample 
An overall condition difference supporting the tacit inferences effect 
again emerged, F(1, 4085) = 308.506, p < .001, d = 0.550. Comparing 
the USA vs. both other countries combined (UK and Australia) did not 
Fig. 1. Intuitive vs. rational evaluations across samples. Higher numbers reflect 
more favorable moral judgments of a lottery winner who continues working 
rather than retiring. As seen in the figure, the intuitive mindset effect is present 
in all samples except for the Indian sample, where intuitive and rational eval-
uations are similar. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Fig. 2. Tacit inferences across cultures. Higher means in Condition 1 than 
Condition 2 reflect false memories consistent with linking traditional work and 
sex morality. As seen in the figure, participants from all samples made such tacit 
inferences. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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reveal a significant difference, F(1, 4071.27) = 0.961, p = .327, d =
0.031. More fine-grained comparisons between the USA and UK, F(1, 
3078) = 0.012, p = .911, d = 0.034, and USA and Australia F(1, 3130) =
2.137, p = .144, d = 0.053, were also not statistically significant. The 
tacit inferences effect was significant within the USA, F(1, 2121) =
181.655, p < .001, d = 0.585, Australia, F(1, 1007) = 53.227, p < .001, 
d = 0.46, and UK, F(1, 951.6) = 78.326, p < .001, d = 0.575, when the 
samples were tested separately (Fig. 2). New England region was not a 
significant moderator of false memories consistent with an implicit link 
between work and sex morality, F(1, 4069.72) = 0.069, p = .793, d =
0.008. 
The individual differences measures, including the single item 
measure of religiosity, F(1, 4067) = 0.393, p = .531, d = 0.020, the 
DUREL scale, F(1, 4081) = 0.29, p = .59, d = 0.017, Protestant religion, 
F(1, 4058.1) = 1.193, p = .167, d = 0.044, and the PWE scale, F(1, 
4079.51) = 3.102, p = .078, d = − 0.0552, did not moderate the tacit 
inferences effect in the PureProfile sample. Notably, this fails to replicate 
the initial evidence of moderation by religiosity (DUREL) and PWE 
scores in the MTurk sample. 
6.3. Discussion 
The results of this first set of replications confirm a number of the 
original experimental effects (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 
2011), yet at the same time depart in theoretically informative ways 
from the original research. One original effect, specifically the moder-
ating role of target age in judgments of needless work, failed to replicate 
across four nations (India, USA, Australia, and the United Kingdom) and 
is identified as a likely false positive. At the same time, a pre-registered 
secondary effect of interest in this “lottery winner” paradigm, the simple 
main effect of working vs. retiring on judgments of moral goodness, 
emerged robustly across samples and nations (see Table 1 and Supple-
ment 7). Although neither Americans nor members of several compar-
ison cultures appear to be sensitive to the age of a lottery winner who 
decides to retire vs. continue working (contrary to the Implicit Puri-
tanism account), people across a number of cultures do appear to 
morally praise needless work (consistent with the General Moralization 
of Work account). 
Of further theoretical interest was the extent to which positive re-
actions to needless work are especially strong in an intuitive rather than 
deliberative mindset. Consistent with the original research, American 
participants praised needless work more strongly when asked for their 
intuitive gut reaction rather than their more deliberative response. 
Inconsistent with the theory of Implicit Puritanism, however, not only 
Americans but also participants from the United Kingdom and Australia 
exhibited this intuitive work morality effect, while Indian participants 
did not. This cross-national pattern of results is highly inconsistent with 
the claim of a unique American work morality, and could reflect the 
greater intuitive moralization of work in self-expression cultures (USA, 
UK, Australia) relative to survival-oriented cultures (India). A more 
nuanced interpretation is that Indian participants strongly moralized 
work both intuitively and deliberatively, such that a difference in 
evaluations based on mindset was unlikely to emerge. Indeed, in a pre- 
registered secondary analysis, a preference for the worker over the 
retiree emerged robustly across mindsets and cultures (Supplement 7). 
Scores consistently above the neutral scale midpoint of 4, indicating a 
preference for needless work, support the General Moralization of Work 
account. Thus, larger-scale research including a greater number of so-
cieties characterized by self-expression and survival values (Inglehart, 
1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) will be needed before drawing strong 
conclusions. We also cannot rule out that the study materials were 
psychologically nonequivalent between the Western and Indian pop-
ulations in some unintended manner, or that some other confound in 
measurement led to the lack of differences in intuitive and deliberative 
judgments in the India sample (Fabrigar et al., in press; Milfont & Klein, 
2018; Poortinga, 1989; van de Vijver & Leung, 2010). 
Another interesting cross-national pattern emerged with regards to 
the tacit inferences drawn from ambiguous scenarios. As in the original 
experiment, U.S. participants falsely remembered individuals who had 
violated work values as having also violated traditional sexual mores, 
and vice versa. However, contrary to the Implicit Puritanism and 
Explicit American Exceptionalism accounts, such false recollections 
likewise emerged robustly in the India, U.K., and Australia samples. The 
effect was statistically significant but diminished in the India sample 
(see Fig. 2). MTurk respondents in India are more likely to hold a uni-
versity degree (86.4% of the sample, as shown in Table S14-1) than the 
general population, potentially artificially attenuating cultural differ-
ences. However, the presence of the tacit inferences effect across all 
samples is most consistent with the pre-registered predictions of the 
General Moralization of Work account. 
Finally, no consistent evidence was found for regional differences 
within the USA (i.e., New England vs. other parts of the country), or the 
expected moderating effects of Protestantism, religiosity, and education 
level. In those few cases where an individual-differences factor signifi-
cantly moderated the effect, the direction of moderation was more often 
opposite to rather than consistent with theoretical expectations. Thus, 
we consider the Social Class, Regional Differences, and Religious Dif-
ferences accounts unsupported by this first cross-national data collection 
in the replication initiative. 
7. Study 2: methods 
Our second study included both online and crowdsourced laboratory 
replications of the salvation prime effect on work performance. The 
original salvation prime experiment was conducted with lay adults 
recruited from public areas in New York State in the United States and 
Ontario, Canada (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2011). The present 
online data collection recruited adults from the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia via the survey firm PureProfile. The laboratory 
data collections strategically oversampled populations in New York state 
to remain as faithful as possible to the original study in terms of region of 
data collection, with materials administered in paper pencil format as in 
the original experiment. Replication laboratories were recruited through 
the last author’s professional network and the Study Swap platform 
(http://osf.io/view/StudySwap/), and relied on locally available sam-
ples of university undergraduates. Note that participant age and method 
of data collection are not theoretically anticipated moderators of the 
salvation prime effect, and that the original line of research on Implicit 
Puritanism featured students and lay adult participants, and both paper- 
pencil and online administration of priming paradigms (Poehlman, 
2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011).  
7.1.1. Participants 
Online data was collected by the survey firm Pure Profile, and 
included 514 (45.73%) USA based participants, 312 (27.76%) partici-
pants from the United Kingdom, and 298 (26.51%) participants from 
Australia. The constituent regions of each country were sampled as 
evenly as feasible, with the exception of again oversampling the New 
England states (N = 270, or 52.52% of the USA sample), in order to 
compare their responses to participants from other USA regions (N =
244, or 47.48% of the USA sample). 
The crowdsourced laboratory data collections in the northeastern 
region of the United States included 95 participants from Ithaca College, 
161 participants from the City University of New York, 208 participants 
from the State University of New York, and 99 participants from Fair-
field University. Data collections outside the U.S. included the Univer-
sity of Regina in Canada (N = 91), and the University of Limerick in 
Ireland (N = 80). See Table S14–2 in Supplement 14 for an overview of 
the demographics of the online and laboratory samples. 
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7.1.2. Design 
The study employed a 2 (priming condition: salvation prime or 
neutral prime) x participant nationality between-subjects design. 
7.1.3. Materials and procedure 
Participants completed two ostensibly unrelated puzzle tasks. The 
first was a scrambled-sentences task (Srull & Wyer, 1979) containing 
either words related to salvation (e.g., redeem, divine, heaven) or simi-
larly valanced words unrelated to religion (e.g., flowers, rainbow, 
happiness). For instance, in the salvation prime condition the scrambled 
sentence “coupons here phone redeem your” could be unscrambled to 
read “redeem your coupons here,” after omitting the word “phone.” 
Following on prior research using anagram performance as a work task 
(Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007), participants then completed 
an anagram challenge in which they attempted to derive as many words 
four or more letters in length as possible out of four source words 
(bimodal, igneous, answer, and curried). 
Moderators. Subsequent to the manipulation and key dependent mea-
sures, participants completed the PWE scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) and 
DUREL (Koenig & Büssing, 2010), as well as the single item religiosity 
measure from the original experiment (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2011). 
Demographics. Participants fill out a set of demographic items paral-
leling those from Study 1. 
Awareness probe. A set of questions assessed awareness of the influence 
of the priming manipulation (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2011; 
adapted from Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). The numeric probe item asked 
“Did the sentence unscrambling task influence your performance on the 
anagram task in any way?” (1 = no, 5 = not sure, 9 = yes). The subse-
quent free response item inquired “If yes, please explain how and why it 
influenced you in your own words.” 
Attention check. Participants completed the same instructional attention 
check as in Study 1. All participants who failed to follow the simple 
instruction to “please select strongly disagree” on a Likert-type scale 
were excluded from the analyses. 
7.2. Results 
7.2.1. PureProfile sample 
Overall, no significant differences emerged in anagram performance 
between the salvation prime and neutral prime conditions, F(1, 
1120.58) = 0.034, p = .854, d = − 0.011. Also unlike in the original 
research, the priming manipulation did not interact with country: USA 
vs other nation (UK & Australia) F(1, 1119.92) = 0.01, p = .989, d =
0.001, USA vs UK, F(1, 820.98) = 0.68, p = .41, d = − 0.0576, or USA vs 
Australia, F(1, 804.37) = 0.682, p = .409, d = 0.058. The salvation 
prime effect on task performance further failed to emerge in any of the 
individual countries, including the United States, F(1, 507.73) = 0.018, 
p = .892, d = − 0.012, Australia, F(1, 298) = 0.908, p = .341, d =
− 0.111, and the United Kingdom, F(1, 312) = 0.838, p = .361, d =
0.1036. New England region also did not moderate the results, F(1, 
1124) = 0.019, p = .89, d = − 0.0079. 
Note that any significant interactions between prime condition and 
moderator measures must be interpreted in light of the absence of any 
main effect of the primes. Whether the participant was of Protestant 
faith did not interact with the priming manipulation to predict anagram 
performance, F(1, 1112.72) = 0.24, p = .625, d = 0.029, the single item 
measure of religiosity did not significantly interact with prime condi-
tion, F(1, 1119.59) = 3.553, p = .06, d = − 0.1127, scores on the DUREL 
religiosity scale significantly interacted with prime condition, F(1, 
1119.95) = 6.64, p = .01, d = − 0.154, and scores on the PWE scale 
significantly interacted with prime condition, F(1, 1117.55) = 4.202, p 
= .041, d = − 0.123. The directions of these latter two interactions were, 
however, contrary to any of the present theories of work morality. 
Specifically, participants high in religiosity (DUREL) exhibited direc-
tionally but non-significantly worse work performance in the salvation 
prime condition relative to the neutral primes, F(1, 227) = 3.043, p =
.082, d = − 0.232, with the least religious participants exhibiting 
directionally but not significantly better work performance in the sal-
vation prime condition, F(1, 265.86) = 1.722, p = .191, d = 0.161. 
Similarly, participants who endorsed the Protestant Work Ethic per-
formed directionally but not significantly worse on a subsequent work 
task after being primed with salvation relative to neutral concepts, F(1, 
177) = 0.923, p = .338, d = − 0.144, whereas low-PWE participants 
worked directionally but nonsignificantly harder in response to the 
primes, F(1, 167.94) = 0.059, p = .809, d = 0.037. 
7.2.2. Laboratory data collections 
In the laboratory data collections, there was again no main effect of 
the priming manipulation on work performance, F(1, 728.58) = 0.269, 
p = .604, d = 0.038, or interaction between nation of data collection and 
the experimental manipulation, USA vs. Republic of Ireland F(1, 
637.15) = 0.045, p = .831, d = − 0.017, USA vs. Canada F(1, 648.16) =
0.25, p = .617, d = 0.0393. The salvation prime effect did not emerge 
when the USA sample, F(1, 649.36) = 0.165, p = .685, d = 0.051, Re-
public of Ireland sample, F(1, 78) = 0.166, p = .685, d = 0.093, and 
Canadian sample, F(1, 89) = 0.06, p = .807, d = − 0.0525, were analyzed 
separately. Regional differences (New England vs. other) were not tested 
since USA laboratory data collections intentionally focused on the 
northeastern United States (i.e., New York State and Connecticut). 
The single-item measure of religiosity, F(1, 721.64) = 2.375, p =
.124, d = 0.115, DUREL, F(1, 727.19) = 3.423, p = .065, d = 0.137, and 
PWE scale, F(1, 727.91) = 0.012, p = .912, d = − 0.008 did not moderate 
the results of the crowdsourced data collection in partner laboratories. 
Unlike in the PureProfile sample, in the laboratory data collections 
Protestant religious faith interacted with the priming manipulation, F(1, 
711.55) = 5.764, p = .017, d = − 0.18. The pattern of the interaction was 
directly contrary to the religious differences account, such that Protes-
tants performed significantly worse on the work task in the salvation 
prime condition relative to the neutral prime condition, F(1, 72.75) =
5.08, p = .027, d = − 0.5285, whereas non-Protestants worked direc-
tionally but nonsignificantly harder when primed with salvation, F(1, 
636.78) = 1.62, p = .204, d = 0.1009. 
7.3. Discussion 
In contrast to the complex pattern of experimental and cross-national 
results from Study 1, the priming replication (Study 2) returned null 
effects and little to no reliable evidence of moderation. Whether the 
experimental paradigm was administered electronically online, or in 
paper-pencil format in more controlled conditions, played no apparent 
role in the primary outcome. Implicitly activating religious concepts 
such as redeem and divine had no reliable main effect on subsequent task 
performance, either in the United States or in the other nations exam-
ined (UK, Australia, Canada, and the Republic of Ireland). 
Sharply contradicting the predictions of the religious differences 
account, in the online sample less religious participants were more likely 
than religious participants to exhibit the salvation prime effect on work 
performance. In the online sample, the direction of moderation from 
endorsement of the Protestant Work Ethic was likewise precisely 
opposite to what one might expect based on prior scholarship on work 
morality (Weber, 1904/1958). However, these individual-differences 
moderators failed to replicate in the laboratory data collections. 
Further, a recent meta-analysis concluded that participants who are 
more religious are more susceptible to the activation of religious con-
cepts (Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2016), a pattern of 
results opposite to that for DUREL religiosity scores in our online 
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investigation. Self-identification as a Protestant interacted with the 
priming manipulation in the crowdsourced laboratory data collection, in 
the direction contrary to the religious differences account, but this 
interaction failed to replicate in the online sample. Overall, this decid-
edly mixed set of results calls for further pre-registered, cross-national 
investigations of the role of individual religiosity and related ideologies 
in responses to the temporary accessibility of religion (van Elk et al., 
2015). Subtly increasing the accessibility of religious concepts could 
potentially influence other dependent measures, such as moral judg-
ments and actions (Shariff et al., 2016; cf. Billingsley, Gomes, & 
McCullough, 2018). However, despite a few caveats (see Supplements 
11 and 12), the present results regarding salvation priming and work 
productivity are most consistent with the false positives account. 
8. Forecasting survey 
Given the findings from both Studies 1 and 2 are quite contrary to the 
original theorizing (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011), an 
interesting question is whether the replication results are predictable by 
psychologists and other scholars. In a forecasting survey accompanying 
the present project, independent scientists were provided with de-
scriptions of the competing theories and asked to try to predict the 
replication effect sizes associated with each targeted effect. Two hun-
dred and twenty-one colleagues made predictions about the target age 
and needless work effect, needless work main effect (works vs. retires) in 
the same “postal worker” scenario, tacit inference effect, intuitive work 
morality effect, and salvation prime effect, across each online sample for 
which data was collected (MTurk: USA and India; PureProfile: New 
England U.S. states, non-New-England U.S. states, Australia, and United 
Kingdom). For each targeted effect, we also asked forecasters to predict 
the aggregated effect size across samples for four key theoretical mod-
erators: participant religious affiliation (Protestant or not), religiosity 
(DUREL score), Protestant work ethic endorsement, and education level. 
Prior investigations demonstrate that scientists can anticipate simple 
condition differences based on mere examination of study abstracts or 
materials (Camerer et al., 2016; DellaVigna & Pope, 2018; Dreber et al., 
2015; Forsell et al., 2019). We examined, for the first time, whether they 
can likewise accurately predict empirical outcomes when the same 
research paradigms are repeated in multiple cultural contexts. See htt 
ps://osf.io/7uhcg/ and Supplements, 4, 5, and 6 for the forecasting 
survey pre-registered analysis plan, survey materials, and a detailed 
report of the results. Summarizing briefly, in our primary hypothesis 
test, we found a statistically significant positive overall association be-
tween realized and predicted effect sizes, β = 0.157, p = .0005. The 
Pearson correlation between the mean predicted effect size of each of the 
48 effects replicated and the observed effect sizes was likewise signifi-
cant, r = 0.704, p < .0001. Thus, even when the pattern of results being 
predicted is quite complex, the accuracy of scientific forecasters remains 
a robust phenomenon (Landy et al., 2020; Tierney et al., in press). 
At the same time, comparing the absolute differences between the 
forecasted and realized effect sizes (Cohen’s d) for each original effect 
underscores that this accuracy was less than perfect. Specifically, fore-
casted effect sizes averaged across populations were significantly 
different from the realized effect sizes, aggregated for each key effect via 
a random effect meta-analysis, for two of the five key effects at the p <
.005 level (Benjamin et al., 2018) and for a third effect at the traditional 
p < .05 level. For the needless work main effect (works vs. retires), mean 
forecasts = 0.3233, and meta analyzed realized effect size = 0.6524, 
with the difference between the two statistically significant, p < .0001, 
such that participants underestimated the replication effect size. Fore-
casters likewise believed the tacit inferences effect would be smaller 
than it turned out to be, mean forecasts = 0.3114, meta analyzed effect 
size = 0.5053, p = .0055. In contrast, for the target age moderating 
needless work effect, participants systematically overestimated the ef-
fect size, mean forecasts = 0.2461, meta analyzed realized effect size =
0.032, p < .0001, believing the effect would replicate when in fact it did 
not. Forecasters expected a small but significant overall salvation prime 
effect, mean forecasts = 0.0972, which did not emerge, meta analyzed 
effect size = 0.0104, but the difference between forecasted and realized 
effect sizes was not statistically significant, p = .9181. Finally, for the 
intuitive work morality effect, mean forecasts = 0.2520, were closely 
aligned with the meta analyzed realized effect size = 0.2568, with no 
significant difference between them, p = .954. 
Overall, forecasters did quite well in anticipating the replication 
outcomes, although they were less accurate in predicting absolute effect 
sizes than their direction and relative ordering. Based on their pattern of 
forecasted results, these independent scientists appear to have endorsed 
the general moralization of work theoretical perspective, in that they 
forecasted all the original effects would emerge and further would do so 
across cultures (see Tables S6–3 and S6–7 in Supplement 6). For the 
most part this facilitated successful forecasts, the general moralization of 
work being the most empirically supported theory in this replication 
initiative. The major exceptions are of course the salvation prime effects 
and target age and needless work effects, which failed to replicate as 
anticipated by the false positives account. Further research should 
continue to examine the extent to which scientists are able to anticipate 
cross-cultural replication results, ideally using a larger number of cul-
tural populations than the relatively small set sampled here, as well as 
effects that exhibit greater heterogeneity across societies. 
9. General discussion 
This large-scale creative destruction replication initiative, which 
involved over eight thousand participants from half a dozen nations, 
systematically competed theories of culture and work morality against 
one another. In addition to directly replicating a set of original experi-
mental effects central to the theory of Implicit Puritanism (Poehlman, 
2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009, 2011), we included new measures and 
populations facilitating novel conceptual tests of the predictions of the 
Explicit American Exceptionalism, general moralization of work, self- 
expression values, social class, religious differences, and regional folk-
ways accounts of work values. 
The observed pattern of experimental and cross-national differences 
and similarities severely undermines the original theory of Implicit Pu-
ritanism. In every instance, the targeted effect either failed to replicate 
entirely, or unexpectedly replicated in multiple cultures when it had been 
predicted to emerge only among Americans. Two original effects— spe-
cifically, the moderating effect of target age on judgments of needless 
work, and influence of implicit salvation primes on work behavior— 
failed to replicate in all populations examined and are identified as likely 
false positives (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2011). In contrast, the 
main effect of moral praise for a lottery winner who continues to work, 
and false memories consistent with an implicit link between work and sex 
morality (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 2009), were robust across 
cultures (India, the United States, Australia, and United Kingdom). 
Finally, the effects of an intuitive mindset on moral judgments of needless 
work replicated across the USA, Australia, and UK samples, but not the 
India sample. The emergence of a number of key effects across a number 
of different nations sharply contradicts Implicit Puritanism’s core theo-
retical claim of a unique American work morality. 
Rather than leaving a theoretical void in the form of reduced confi-
dence in the original findings and the underlying ideas, these results 
point in new theoretical directions. Specifically, they provide initial 
evidence that work behavior elicits strong moral intuitions across cul-
tures, and that the gap between intuitive and deliberative feelings about 
work could be larger in wealthier societies. Personal religion (e.g., 
Protestant faith), degree of religiosity, socioeconomic status, and region 
of the United States (e.g., historically Puritan-Protestant New England) 
did not moderate any of the observed experimental effects, failing to 
support the associated accounts of work values. More investigations 
involving larger samples of countries, especially societies in which 
survival rather than self-expression values are widely endorsed 
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(Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), and with varied historic 
backgrounds and diverse workways (Sanchez-Burks & Lee, 2007) are 
needed before drawing strong conclusions (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, 
2017). At the same time, we believe the present investigation highlights 
the feasibility and generative nature of the creative destruction 
approach to replication, in identifying the most promising theories to 
guide further empirical research. 
9.1. A Bayesian multiverse analysis 
A pre-registered (https://osf.io/pgfm8) Bayesian multiverse analysis 
examined the consequences of different inclusion criteria, variable 
operationalizations, and statistical approaches for the replication results 
(see Haaf, Hoogeveen, Berkhout, Gronau, & Wagenmakers, 2020; Haaf 
& Rouder, 2017; Rouder, Haaf, Davis-Stober, & Hilgard, 2019). Overall, 
the results of the Bayesian multiverse are highly consistent with the 
frequentist analyses reported earlier (see Supplement 9 for a more 
detailed report). Strong evidence emerged that the tacit inference effect 
and overall valorization of needless work (regardless of target age or 
participant mindset) are true-positives and further present across sam-
ples. Although less strongly, the data also support an overall intuitive 
mindset effect across all samples combined. Finally, strong evidence 
emerged against the target age and needless work effect, and the salva-
tion prime effect. The latter remained unsupported even in those con-
ditions pre-specified as most favorable for priming effects, specifically 
controlled laboratory studies and excluding participants suspicious of 
being influenced or whom had failed to complete all the scrambled 
sentences. The Implicit Puritanism model performed worse than the 
winning model for all six original effects. The General Moralization of 
Work and False Positives accounts were the best fitting models overall, 
depending on the effect in question. The Protestant work ethic was 
found to positively predict the main effects of needless work (i.e., 
preference for worker over retiree regardless of target age or participant 
mindset), but such judgments did not vary across cultures as predicted 
by the Explicit American Exceptionalism account or any of the other 
competing theories (see Furnham et al., 1993, and Leong, Huang, & 
Mak, 2014, for evidence “Protestant” work ethic beliefs are broadly 
applicable). Empirical estimates converged across the different uni-
verses of potential analyses (see Fig. S9–1 in Supplement 9). Effects that 
were not replicated in the primary analyses were not supported under 
any specification in the Bayesian multiverse, and replicable effects 
found evidentiary support across many different specifications. 
9.2. False inferences in cross-cultural experiments 
The present replication results highlight potential broader challenges 
for producing robust and reliable cross-cultural experimental research 
(Milfont & Klein, 2018). We define an x-cultural experiment as a study 
containing a manipulation (e.g., random assignment to condition A or 
condition B) and sampling at least two distinct cultural populations (e. 
g., university students in China and the United States). More broadly 
than the typical concerns about false positive findings (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Simmons et al., 2011), such cross-cultural in-
vestigations are open to false inferences about patterns of experimental 
results across different human populations. In addition to the expected 
condition differences failing to emerge (e.g., salvation prime effect, 
target age and needless work effect), cross-cultural findings may prove 
over-robust, in other words emerging in societies where they were 
theoretically expected not to (e.g., the tacit inferences effect and intui-
tive work morality effect replicating outside the United States). False 
inferences could also involve concluding a phenomenon is culturally 
bounded when it is fact universal, and mis-estimating the direction or 
relative magnitude of an effect between two cultures, among other 
empirical patterns. 
At least two major features of an x-cultural experiment increase the 
chances of drawing such false conclusions, relative to a simple two- 
condition experiment in a single population. First, x-cultural studies 
often rely on an interaction between membership in a cultural group and 
an experimental manipulation as the key statistical test of the hypoth-
esized cultural difference. Between-subjects interaction tests are typi-
cally underpowered unless very large samples are recruited (Simonsohn, 
2014; Smith, Levine, Lachlan, & Fediuk, 2002). The Open Science Col-
laboration’s Reproducibility Project: Psychology replicated 23 of 49 
targeted studies (47%) whose key test was a main or simple effect, and 
only 8 of 37 studies (22%) when the key test was an interaction. Second, 
x-cultural experiments typically rely on small convenience samples and 
attempt to generalize to broader cultures. For example, 100 participants 
per location might be recruited from universities in New Haven, USA, 
and Xiamen, China. Since societies are quite heterogeneous (Kitayama 
et al., 2006; Muthukrishna et al., 2020; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Talhelm 
et al., 2014), this approach may or may not capture central tendencies in 
the United States and China. 
In the present replication initiative a number of the experimental 
condition differences emerged (i.e., tacit inferences effect, intuitive 
work morality effect, needless work main effect), yet none of the original 
condition x national culture interactions (Poehlman et al., 2007; Uhl-
mann et al., 2009, 2011) were obtained again. The Many Labs 2 crowd 
initiative likewise failed to replicate previously reported interactions 
between experimental manipulations and cultural populations, even 
some considered well-established findings (Klein et al., 2018). To guard 
against such problems, future cross-cultural behavioral research should 
seek to collect larger and more varied samples. Researchers might form a 
network of laboratories and crowdsource data collections at multiple 
sites in each nation (Cuccolo, Irgens, Zlokovich, Grahe, & Edlund, in 
press; Moshontz et al., 2018), or partner with a survey firm to system-
atically sample respondents from different regions of the same country, 
ideally achieving representative sampling. 
Different cultural theories predict distinct patterns of empirical re-
sults, and some may be more subject to false inferences than others. In a 
presence-absence pattern, an experimental effect is hypothesized to 
emerge in one culture, but not in the other. Most of the original Implicit 
Puritanism studies predicted and found such a pattern, for example an 
implicit link between work and sex morality among Americans, but not 
members of other cultures. In a reduced pattern, the effect is in the same 
direction for both cultures, but diminished in some cultures relative to 
others (e.g., varying degrees of loss aversion among members of 
different nations; Arkes, Hirshleifer, Jiang, & Lim, 2010). Finally, in a 
reversal pattern, the effects of an experimental manipulation are expected 
to fully reverse between a focal culture and comparison culture. For 
example, Gelfand et al. (2002) predicted and found that whereas 
American participants were significantly more disposed to accept posi-
tive than negative feedback, Japanese participants exhibited the oppo-
site pattern, accepting more personal responsibility for negative than for 
positive feedback. We suggest that future theorizing on culture focus on 
developing such reversal predictions, which rely on better powered 
crossover interactions, and are less likely to be confounded by mea-
surement challenges than presence-absence patterns or reduced 
patterns. 
9.3. The broader utility of the creative destruction approach 
The present culture and work morality project is the first of several 
recent initiatives applying the creative destruction approach to repli-
cation to previously published findings from our research group (see 
Tierney et al., in press, for a review). Adding to the recent deluge of 
failed replications of experimental behavioral findings (e.g., Klein et al., 
2014, 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), none of these replica-
tion studies succeeding in reproducing the original patterns of results. 
However, unlike prior replication initiatives, we were able to obtain 
positive evidence for alternative theoretical accounts (Supplement 13). 
We believe this highlights the general utility of the creative 
destruction approach to replication, which seeks to combine theory 
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pruning methods from the management literature (Leavitt et al., 2010), 
with best practices from the open science movement in psychology such 
as pre-registration (Van’t Veer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016; Wagenmakers 
et al., 2012) to achieve critical tests (Mayo, 2018) of competing intel-
lectual ideas. Unlike traditional replication approaches, in which the 
original finding is tested against the expectation of null effects, the 
creative destruction approach seeks to identify the strongest theory 
currently operating in a given intellectual space. 
Of course, not all research topics and original findings are well suited 
for large-scale competitive theory testing. As discussed at greater length 
by Tierney et al. (in press), the creative destruction approach is best 
suited to mature research areas with substantial published evidence, 
common methodological approaches, and well-developed theories that 
make precise, bounded predictions distinct from those of other theories. 
In contrast, traditional replications simply repeating the original method 
are better suited to confirming or disconfirming potential new break-
through findings. Scientists should carefully allocate scarce replication 
resources for maximum impact, leveraging the methods best suited to 
the situation. It is our hope the present line of research contributes to a 
Replication 2.0 movement, in which rather than solely probing the 
reliability of past findings, scientists also focus on replacing them with 
new and improved accounts of human behavior. 
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Sebastian Hafenbrädl, IESE Business School 
Linda Hagen, University of Southern Califonia 
David Hagmann, Harvard Kennedy School 
Jonathan J. Hammersley, Western Illinois University 
Hyemin Han, University of Alabama 
Andree Hartanto, Singapore Management University 
Renata M. Heilman, Babes-Bolyai University, Department of 
Psychology 
Alexander P. Henkel, Open University of the Netherlands 
Felix Holzmeister, Department of Economics, University of 
Innsbruck 
Qian Huang, University of Miami 
Tina S.-T. Huang, University College London 
Barbora Hubena, Ministerstvo zdravotnictví České republiky 
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Danka B. Purić, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, 
Department of Psychology and Laboratory for Research of Individual 
Differences 
M. S. Rad, New School 
Louis Raes, Tilburg University 
Rima-Maria Rahal, Tilburg University 
W. Tierney et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 93 (2021) 104060
16
Liz Redford 
Christopher M. Redker, Ferris State University 
Niv Reggev, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
Caleb J. Reynolds, Florida State University 
Marta Roczniewska 
Ivan Ropovik, Charles University, Faculty of Education, Institute for 
Research and Development of Education & University of Presov, Faculty 
of Education 
Lukas Röseler, Harz University of Applied Sciences, University of 
Bamberg 
Robert M. Ross, Macquarie University 
Amanda Rotella, Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 
Canada 
Raluca Rusu 
Michael Schaerer, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore 
Management University 
William M. Schiavone, University of Georgia 
Landon Schnabel, Stanford University and Cornell University 
Brendan A. Schuetze, The University of Texas at Austin 
Irene Scopelliti, City, University of London 
Zeev Shtudiner, Ariel University 
Deborah Shulman 
Victoria Song, Fordham University 
Tabea Springstein, Washington University in St. Louis 
Eirik Strømland, University of Bergen 
Kevin P. Sweeney, Western Kentucky University 
Maria A. Terskova, National Research University Higher School of 
Economics 
Kian Siong Tey, INSEAD 
Fransisca Ting, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Joshua M. Tybur, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
Karolina Urbanska, Department of Psychology, University of 
Sheffield 
Paul Vanags, University of Oxford Brookes 
Joseph A. Vitriol, Stony Brook University 
Alisa Voslinsky, Department of Industrial Engineering and Manage-
ment, Sami Shamoon 
Academic College of Engineering, Ashdod, Israel 
Marek A. Vranka, Charles University 
Lauren E.T. Wakabayashi, Loma Linda University 
Hanne M. Watkins, UMass Amherst 
Erin C. Westgate, University of Florida 
Margaux N. A. Wienk, Department of Psychology, Columbia 
University 
Jan K. Woike, University of Plymouth, UK 
Conny E.Wollbrant, University of Stirling 
Amanda J. Wright, Washington University in St. Louis 
Qinyu Xiao, University of Hong Kong 
Alon Yakter, Tel Aviv University 
Yurik Yang, Fakultas Psikologi Universitas Indonesia 
Zhixu Yang, Purdue University 
Siu Kit Yeung, The University of Hong Kong 
Onurcan Yilmaz, Kadir Has University 
Meltem Yucel, University of Virginia 
Cristina Zogmaister, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca 
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